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ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ
Àâòîð ïðåäëàãàåìîé ñòàòüè Äåéë Éîðãåíñîí ÿâëÿåòñÿ îäíèì èç
íàèáîëåå çíà÷èìûõ ñîâðåìåííûõ ýêîíîìèñòîâ. Åãî áëåñòÿùèå ðàáî-
òû â ðàçëè÷íûõ îáëàñòÿõ ýêîíîìèêè ïðèíåñëè åìó çàñëóæåííîå
óâàæåíèå êîëëåã âî âñåì ìèðå. Â ñâîåé ñòðàíå ïðîôåññîð Ä. Éîðãåí-
ñîí èçáèðàëñÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Àìåðèêàíñêîãî ýêîíîìåòðè÷åñêîãî îá-
ùåñòâà â 1987 ã. Â íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ îí ÿâëÿåòñÿ ïðåçèäåíòîì Àìå-
ðèêàíñêîé ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé àññîöèàöèè.
Çíà÷èòåëåí âêëàä ïðîôåññîðà Ä. Éîðãåíñîíà â âîñïèòàíèå ìîëî-
äûõ ýêîíîìèñòîâ â çíàìåíèòûõ óíèâåðñèòåòàõ: Áåðêëè ñ 1959 ïî
1969 ãã. è ñ 1969 ã. – â Ãàðâàðäå.
Ïðîôåññîð Ä.  Éîðãåíñîí ëþáåçíî ïðåäîñòàâèë «Ýêîíîìè÷åñêîìó
æóðíàëó ÂØÝ» ïðàâî îïóáëèêîâàòü ñâîå åæåãîäíîå îáðàùåíèå ê ÷ëå-
íàì Àìåðèêàíñêîé ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé àññîöèàöèè îò 6 ÿíâàðÿ 2001 ã. Îä -
íîâðåìåííî  ñ «Ýêîíîìè÷åñêèì æóðíàëîì ÂØÝ» ýòî îáðàùåíèå áó-
äåò íàïå÷àòàíî â «American Economic Review» (Vol. 91, ¹ 1, ð. 1–32).
Âî âðåìÿ ïðåäñòîÿùåãî âèçèòà â ÃÓ–ÂØÝ, â ñåðåäèíå ìàÿ 2001 ã.,
ïðîôåññîð Ä. Éîðãåíñîí âûñòóïèò ñ îòêðûòîé ëåêöèåé, òåìà êî-
òîðîé ðàçâèâàåò ñîäåðæàíèå äàííîé ïóáëèêàöèè.
Information Technology and the U.S. Economy
Presidential Address to the American Economic Association,
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 6, 2001 by
Dale W. Jorgenson1)
The resurgence of the American economy since 1995 has outrun all but the
most optimistic expectations. Economic forecasting models have been seriously off
track and growth projections have been revised to reflect a more sanguine outlook
only recently2). It is not surprising that the unusual combination of more rapid
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growth and slower inflation in the 1990's has touched off a strenuous debate among
economists about whether improvements in America's economic performance can be
sustained.
The starting point for the economic debate is the thesis that the 1990's are a
mirror image of the 1970's, when an unfavorable series of «supply shocks» led to
stagflation – slower growth and higher inflation3). In this view, the development of
information technology (IT) is one of a series of positive, but temporary, shocks. The
competing perspective is that IT has produced a fundamental change in the U.S.
economy, leading to a permanent improvement in growth prospects4).
The relentless decline in the prices of information technology equipment has
steadily enhanced the role of IT investment as a source of American economic growth.
Productivity growth in IT-producing industries has gradually risen in importance and
a productivity revival is now underway in the rest of the economy. Despite diffe-
rences in methodology and data sources, a consensus is building that the remarkable
behavior of IT prices provides the key to the surge in economic growth.
In the following section I show that the foundation for the American growth
resurgence is the development and deployment of semiconductors. The decline in IT
prices is rooted in developments in semiconductor technology that are widely under-
stood by technologists and economists. This technology has found its broadest appli-
cations in computing and communications equipment, but has reduced the cost of a
wide variety of other products.
A substantial acceleration in the IT price decline occurred in 1995, triggered
by a much sharper acceleration in the price decline of semiconductors in 1994. A l-
though the decline in semiconductor prices has been projected to continue for at
least another decade, the recent acceleration could be temporary. This can be traced
to a shift in the product cycle for semiconductors from three years to two years that
took place in 1995 as the consequence of intensifying competition in markets for
semiconductor products.
In Section II I outline a framework for analyzing the role of information tech-
nology in the American growth resurgence. Constant quality price indexes separate
the change in the performance of IT equipment from the change in price for a given
level of performance. Accurate and timely computer prices have been part of the
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) since 1985. Unfortunately, i m-
portant information gaps remain, especially on trends in prices for closely related
investments, such as software and communications equipment.
The cost of capital is an essential concept for capturing the economic impact of
information technology prices. Swiftly falling prices provide powerful economic i n-
centives for the substitution of IT equipment for other forms of capital and for labor
services. The rate of the IT price decline is a key component of the cost of capital,
required for assessing the impacts of rapidly growing stocks of computers, communi-
cations equipment, and software.
In Section III I analyze the impact of the 1995 acceleration in the information
technology price decline on U.S. economic growth. I introduce a production possibility
frontier that encompasses substitutions between outputs of consumption and invest-
ment goods, as well as inputs of capital and labor services. This frontier treats IT
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equipment as part of investment goods output and the capital services from this
equipment as a component of capital input.
Capital input has been the most important source of U.S. economic growth
throughout the postwar period. More rapid substitution toward information technol-
ogy has given much additional weight to components of capital input with higher
marginal products. The vaulting contribution of capital input since 1995 has boosted
growth by nearly a full percentage point. The contribution of IT accounts for more
than half of this increase. Computers have been the predominant impetus to faster
growth, but communications equipment and software have made important contri-
butions as well.
The accelerated information technology price decline signals faster productiv-
ity growth in IT-producing industries. In fact, these industries have been the source
of most of aggregate productivity growth throughout the 1990's. Before 1995 this
was due to the decline of productivity growth elsewhere in the economy. The IT-
producing industries have accounted for about half the surge in productivity growth
since 1995, but faster growth is not limited to these industries.
I conclude that the decline in IT prices will continue for some time. This will
provide incentives for the ongoing substitution of IT for other productive inputs.
Falling IT prices also serve as an indicator of rapid productivity growth in IT-
producing industries. However, it would be premature to extrapolate the recent ac-
celeration in productivity growth in these industries into the indefinite future, since
this depends on the persistence of a two-year product cycle for semiconductors.
In Section IV I outline research opportunities created by the development and
diffusion of information technology. A voluminous and rapidly expanding business
literature is testimony to the massive impact of IT on firms and product markets.
Highest priority must be given to a better understanding of the markets for semi-
conductors. Although several models of the market for semiconductors already exist,
none explains the shift from a three-year to a two-year product cycle.
The dramatic effects of information technology on capital and labor markets
have already generated a substantial and growing economic literature, but many
important issues remain to be resolved. For capital markets the relationship between
equity valuations and growth prospects merits much further study. For labor mar-
kets more research is needed on investment in information technology and substitu-
tion among different types of labor.
I. The Information Age
The development and deployment of information technology is the foundation
of the American growth resurgence. A mantra of the «new economy» – faster, bet-
ter, cheaper – captures the speed of technological change and product improvement
in semiconductors and the precipitous and continuing fall in semiconductor prices.
The price decline has been transmitted to the prices of products that rely heavily on
semiconductor technology, like computers and telecommunications equipment. This
technology has also helped to reduce the cost of aircraft, automobiles, scientific i n-
struments, and a host of other products.
Modern information technology begins with the invention of the transistor, a
semiconductor device that acts as an electrical switch and encodes information in b i-
nary form. A binary digit or bit takes the values zero and one, corresponding to the off6 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
and on positions of a switch. The first transistor, made of the semiconductor germa-
nium, was constructed at Bell Labs in 1947 and won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1956
for the inventors – John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley5).
The next major milestone in information technology was the co-invention of
the integrated circuit by Jack Kilby of Texas Instruments in 1958 and Robert Noyce
of Fairchild Semiconductor in 1959. An integrated circuit consists of many, even mil-
lions, of transistors that store and manipulate data in binary form. Integrated cir-
cuits were originally developed for data storage and retrieval and semiconductor sto-
rage devices became known as memory chips6).
The first patent for the integrated circuit was granted to Noyce. This resulted
in a decade of litigation over the intellectual property rights. The litigation and its
outcome demonstrate the critical importance of intellectual property in the develop-
ment of information technology. Kilby was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in
2000 for discovery of the integrated circuit; regrettably, Noyce died in 19907).
A. Moore's Law
In 1965 Gordon E. Moore, then Research Director at Fairchild Semiconductor,
made a prescient observation, later known as Moore's Law8). Plotting data on mem-
ory chips, he observed that each new chip contained roughly twice as many tran-
sistors as the previous chip and was released within 18–24 months of its predecessor.
This implied exponential growth of chip capacity at 35–45 percent per year! Moore's
prediction, made in the infancy of the semiconductor industry, has tracked chip ca-
pacity for thirty-five years. He recently extrapolated this trend for at least another
decade9).
In 1968 Moore and Noyce founded Intel Corporation to speed the commerciali-
zation of memory chips10). Integrated circuits gave rise to microprocessors with func-
tions that can be programmed by software, known as logic chips. Intel's first general
purpose microprocessor was developed for a calculator produced by Busicom, a Japa-
nese firm. Intel retained the intellectual property rights and released the device com-
mercially in 1971.
The rapidly rising trends in the capacity of microprocessors and storage d e-
vices illustrate the exponential growth predicted by Moore's Law. The first logic chip
in 1971 had 2,300 transistors, while the Pentium 4 released on November 20, 2000,
had 42 million! Over this twenty-nine year period the number of transistors i n -
creased by thirty-four percent per year. The rate of productivity growth for the U.S.
economy during this period was slower by two orders of magnitude.
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B. Semiconductor Prices
Moore's Law captures the fact that successive generations of semiconductors
are faster and better. The economics of semiconductors begins with the closely r e-
lated observation that semiconductors have become cheaper at a truly staggering
rate! Chart 111) gives semiconductor price indexes constructed by Bruce T. Grimm
(1998) of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and employed in the U.S. National
Income and Product Accounts since 1996. These are divided between memory chips
and logic chips. The underlying detail includes seven types of memory chips and two
types of logic chips.
Between 1974 and 1996 prices of memory chips decreased by a factor of 27,270
times or at 40.9 percent per year, while the implicit deflator for the gross domestic
product (GDP) increased by almost 2.7 times or 4.6 percent per year! Prices of logic
chips, available for the shorter period 1985 to 1996, decreased by a factor of 1,938 or
54.1 percent per year, while the GDP deflator increased by 1.3 times or 2.6 percent
per year! Semiconductor price declines closely parallel Moore's Law on the growth of
chip capacity, setting semiconductors apart from other products.
Chart 1 also reveals a sharp acceleration in the decline of semiconductor prices
in 1994 and 1995. The microprocessor price decline leapt to more than ninety percent
per year as the semiconductor industry shifted from a three-year product cycle to a
greatly accelerated two-year cycle. This is reflected in the 2000 Update of the Inter-
national Technology Road Map for Semiconductors12), prepared by a consortium of in-
dustry associations.
C. Constant Quality Price Indexes
The behavior of semiconductor prices is a severe test for the methods used in
the official price statistics. The challenge is to separate observed price changes bet-
ween changes in semiconductor performance and changes in price that hold perfor-
mance constant. Achieving this objective has required a detailed understanding of
the technology, the development of sophisticated measurement techniques, and the
introduction of novel methods for assembling the requisite information.
Ellen R. Dulberger (1993) of IBM introduced a «matched model» index for se-
miconductor prices. A matched model index combines price relatives for products
with the same performance at different points of time. Dulberger presented constant
quality price indexes based on index number formulas, including the Fisher (1922)
ideal index used in the in the U.S. national accounts13). The Fisher index is the geo-
metric average of the familiar Laspeyres and Paasche indexes.
W. Erwin Diewert (1976) defined a superlative index number as an index that
exactly  replicates a  flexible representation of the underlying technology (or prefe-
rences). A flexible representation provides a second-order approximation to an arbi-
trary technology (or preferences). A.A. Konus and S.S. Byushgens (1926) first showed
that the Fisher ideal index is superlative in this sense. Laspeyres and Paasche indexes
are not superlative and fail to capture substitutions among products in response to
price changes accurately.
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Grimm (1998) combined matched model techniques with hedonic methods, ba-
sed on an econometric model of semiconductor prices at different points of time. A
hedonic model gives the price of a semiconductor product as a function of the char-
acteristics that determine performance, such as speed of processing and storage ca-
pacity. A constant quality price index isolates the price change by holding these
characteristics of semiconductors fixed.
Beginning in 1997, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) incorporated a
matched model price index for semiconductors into the Producer Price Index (PPI)
and since then the national accounts have relied on data from the PPI. Reflecting
long-standing BLS policy, historical data were not revised backward. Semiconductor
prices reported in the PPI prior to 1997 do not hold quality constant, failing to cap-
ture the rapid semiconductor price decline and the acceleration in 1994.
D. Computers
The introduction of the Personal Computer (PC) by IBM in 1981 was a wa-
tershed event in the deployment of information technology. The sale of Intel's 8086-
8088 microprocessor to IBM in 1978 for incorporation into the PC was a major busi-
ness breakthrough for Intel14). In 1981 IBM licensed the MS-DOS operating system
from the Microsoft Corporation, founded by Bill Gates and Paul Allen in 1975. The
PC established an Intel/Microsoft relationship that has continued up to the present.
In 1985 Microsoft released the first version of Windows, its signature operating sys-
tem for the PC, giving rise to the Wintel (Windows-Intel) nomenclature for this on-
going collaboration.
Mainframe computers, as well as PC's, have come to rely heavily on logic chips
for central processing and memory chips for main memory. However, semiconductors
account for less than half of computer costs and computer prices have fallen much less
rapidly than semiconductor prices. Precise measures of computer prices that hold
product quality constant were introduced into the NIPA in 1985 and the PPI during
the 1990's. The national accounts now rely on PPI data, but historical data on compu-
ters from the PPI, like the PPI data on semiconductors, do not hold quality constant.
Gregory C. Chow (1967) pioneered the use of hedonic techniques for con-
structing a constant quality index of computer prices in research conducted at IBM.
Chow documented price declines at more than twenty percent per year during 1960-
1965, providing an initial glimpse of the remarkable behavior of computer prices15).
In 1985 the Bureau of Economic Analysis incorporated constant quality price indexes
for computers and peripheral equipment constructed by Rosanne Cole, Y.C. Chen,
Joan A. Barquin-Stolleman, Ellen R. Dulberger, Nurthan Helvacian, and James H.
Hodge (1986) of IBM into the NIPA. Jack E. Triplett (1986) discussed the economic
interpretation of these indexes, bringing the rapid decline of computer prices to the
attention of a very broad audience.
The BEA-IBM constant quality price index for computers provoked a heated
exchange between BEA and Edward F. Denison (1989), one of the founders of natio-
nal accounting methodology in the 1950's and head of the national accounts at BEA
from 1979 to 1982. Denison sharply attacked the BEA-IBM methodology and argued
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vigorously against the introduction of constant quality price indexes into the national
accounts16). Allan Young (1989), then Director of BEA, reiterated BEA's rationale for
introducing constant quality price indexes.
Dulberger (1989) presented a more detailed report on her research on the prices
of computer processors for the BEA-IBM project. Speed of processing and main me-
mory played central roles in her model. Triplett (1989) provided an exhaustive survey
of research on hedonic price indexes for computers. Robert J. Gordon (1989, 1990) gave
an alternative model of computer prices and identified computers and communications
equipment, along with commercial aircraft, as assets with the highest rates of price
decline.
Chart 2 gives BEA's constant quality index of prices of computers and periph-
eral equipment and its components, including mainframes, PC's, storage devices, ot-
her peripheral equipment, and terminals. The decline in computer prices follows the
behavior of semiconductor prices presented in Chart 1, but in much attenuated form.
The 1995 acceleration in the computer price decline parallels the acceleration in the
semiconductor price decline that resulted from the changeover from a three-year
product cycle to a two-year cycle in 1995.
E. Communications equipment and software
Communications technology is crucial for the rapid development and diffusion
of the Internet, perhaps the most striking manifestation of information technology in
the American economy17). Kenneth Flamm (1989) was the first to compare the beha-
vior of computer prices and the prices of communications equipment. He concluded
that the communications equipment prices fell only a little more slowly than compu-
ter prices. Gordon (1990) compared Flamm's results with the official price indexes,
revealing substantial bias in the official indexes.
Communications equipment is an important market for semiconductors, but
constant quality price indexes cover only a portion of this equipment. Switching and
terminal equipment rely heavily on semiconductor technology, so that product deve-
lopment reflects improvements in semiconductors. Grimm's (1997) constant quality
price index for digital telephone switching equipment, given in Chart 3, was incorpo-
rated into the national accounts in 1996. The output of communications services in
the NIPA also incorporates a constant quality price index for cellular phones.
Much communications investment takes the form of the transmission gear,
connecting data, voice, and video terminals to switching equipment. Technologies
such as fiber optics, microwave broadcasting, and communications satellites have
progressed at rates that outrun even the dramatic pace of semiconductor develop-
ment. An example is dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM), a technology
that sends multiple signals over an optical fiber simultaneously. Installation of
DWDM equipment, beginning in 1997, has doubled the transmission capacity of fiber
optic cables every 6–12 months18).
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Both software and hardware are essential for information technology and this is
reflected in the large volume of software expenditures. The eleventh comprehensive
revision of the national accounts, released by BEA on October 27, 1999, re-classified
computer software as investment19). Before this important advance, business expen-
ditures on software were treated as current outlays, while personal and government
expenditures were treated as purchases of nondurable goods. Software investment is
growing rapidly and is now much more important than investment in computer hard-
ware.
Robert P. Parker and Grimm (2000) describe the new estimates of investment in
software. BEA distinguishes among three types of software – prepackaged, custom,
and own-account software. Prepackaged software is sold or licensed in standardized
form and is delivered in packages or electronic files downloaded from the Internet.
Custom software is tailored to the specific application of the user and is delivered
along with analysis, design, and programming services required for customization.
Own-account software consists of software created for a specific application. However,
only price indexes for prepackaged software hold performance constant.
Parker and Grimm (2000) present a constant quality price index for prepack-
aged software, given in Chart 3. This combines a hedonic model of prices for busi-
ness applications software and a matched model index for spreadsheet and word
processing programs developed by Steven D. Oliner and Daniel D. Sichel (1994). Pre-
packaged software prices decline at more than ten percent per year over the period
1962-1998. Since 1998 the BEA has relied on a matched model price index for all
prepackaged software from the PPI; prior to 1998 the PPI data do not hold quality
constant.
BEA's prices for own-account software are based on programmer wage rates.
This implicitly assumes no change in the productivity of computer programmers,
even with growing investment in hardware and software to support the creation of
new software. Custom software prices are a weighted average of prepackaged and
own-account software prices with arbitrary weights of 75 percent for own-account
and 25 percent for prepackaged software. These price indexes do not hold the soft-
ware performance constant and present a distorted picture of software prices, as
well as software output and investment.
F. Research Opportunities
The official price indexes for computers and semiconductors provide the para-
digm for economic measurement. These indexes capture the steady decline in IT prices
and the recent acceleration in this decline. The official price indexes for central office
switching equipment and prepackaged software also hold quality constant. BEA and
BLS, the leading statistical agencies in price research, have carried out much of the
best work in this area. However, a critical role has been played by price research at
IBM, long the dominant firm in information technology20).
It is important to emphasize that information technology is not limited to ap-
plications of semiconductors. Switching and terminal equipment for voice, data, and
video communications have come to rely on semiconductor technology and the empi-
rical evidence on prices of this equipment reflects this fact. Transmission gear e m-
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ploys technologies with rates of progress that far outstrip those of semiconductors.
This important gap in our official price statistics can only be filled by constant qual-
ity price indexes for all types of communications equipment.
Investment in software is more important than investment in hardware. This
was essentially invisible until BEA introduced new measures of prepackaged, cus-
tom, and own-account software investment into the national accounts in 1999. This is
a crucial step in understanding the role of information technology in the American
economy. Unfortunately, software prices are another statistical blind spot with only
prices of prepackaged software adequately represented in the official system of
price statistics. The daunting challenge that lies ahead is to construct constant qual-
ity price indexes for custom and own-account software.
II. The Role of Information Technology
At the aggregate level IT is identified with the outputs of computers, commu-
nications equipment, and software. These products appear  in the GDP as  invest-
ments by businesses, households, and governments along with net exports to the rest
of  the  world.  The GDP  also  includes  the  services  of IT  products  consumed  by
households and governments. A methodology for analyzing economic growth must
capture the substitution of IT outputs for other outputs of goods and services.
While semiconductor technology is the driving force behind the spread of IT,
the impact of the relentless decline in semiconductor prices is transmitted through
falling IT  prices.  Only  net  exports  of  semiconductors,  defined  as  the  difference
between U.S. exports to the rest of the world and U.S. imports appear in the GDP.
Sales  of  semiconductors  to  domestic  manufacturers  of IT  products  are  precisely
offset by purchases of semiconductors and are excluded from the GDP.
Constant quality price indexes, like those reviewed in the previous section, are
a key component of the methodology for analyzing the American growth resurgence.
Computer prices were incorporated into the NIPA in 1985 and are now part of the
PPI as well. Much more recently, semiconductor prices have been included in the
NIPA and the PPI. Unfortunately, evidence on the prices of communications equip-
ment  and  software  is  seriously  incomplete,  so  that  the  official  price  indexes  are
seriously misleading.
A. Output
The output data in Table 1 are based on the most recent benchmark revision
of the national accounts, updated through 199921). The output concept is similar, but
not identical, to the concept of gross domestic product used by the BEA. Both mea-
sures include final outputs purchased by businesses, governments, households, and
the rest of the world. Unlike the BEA concept, the output measure in Table 1 also in-
cludes imputations for the service flows from durable goods, including IT products,
employed in the household and government sectors.
The imputations for services of IT equipment are based on the cost of capital
for IT described in more detail below. The cost of capital is multiplied by the no-
minal value of IT capital stock to obtain the imputed service flow from IT products.
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In the business sector this accrues as capital income to the firms that employ these
products  as  inputs.  In  the  household and  government  sectors  the  flow  of  capital
income must be imputed. This same type of imputation is used for housing in the
NIPA. The rental value of renter-occupied housing accrues to real estate firms as ca-
pital income, while the rental value of owner-occupied housing is imputed to house-
holds.
Current dollar GDP in Table 1 is $9.8 trillions in 1999, including imputations,
and real output growth averaged 3.46 percent for the period 1948-99. These mag-
nitudes can be compared to the current dollar value of $9.3 trillions in 1999 and the
average real growth rate of 3.40 percent for period 1948-99 for the official GDP.
Table 1 presents the current dollar value and price indexes of the GDP and IT out-
put. This includes outputs of investment goods in the form of computers, software,
communications equipment, and non-IT investment goods. It also includes outputs of
non-IT consumption goods and services as well as imputed IT capital service flows
from households and governments.
The most striking feature of the data in Table 1 is the rapid price decline for
computer investment, 17.1 percent per year from 1959 to 1995. Since 1995 this decline
has almost doubled to 32.1 percent per year. By contrast the relative price of software
has been flat for much of the period and began to fall only in the late 1980's. The price
of communications equipment behaves similarly to the software price, while the con-
sumption of capital services from computers and software by households and govern-
ments shows price declines similar to computer investment.
The top panel of Table 2 summarizes the growth rates of prices and quantities
for major output categories for 1990–5 and 1995–9. Business investments in compu-
ters, software, and communications equipment are the largest categories of IT spen-
ding. Households and governments have also spent sizable amounts on computers,
software,  communications  equipment  and  the  services  of  information  technology.
Chart 4 shows that the output of software is the largest IT category as a share of
GDP, followed by the outputs of computers and communications equipment.
Â. Capital Services
 
  This section presents  capital  estimates for  the U.S.  economy for  the  period
1948  to 199922). These begin with BEA  investment data;  the  perpetual  inventory
method generates estimates of capital stocks and these are aggregated, using service
prices as weights. This approach, originated by Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches (1996), is
based on the identification of service prices with marginal products of different ty-
pes of capital. The service price estimates incorporate the cost of capital23).
  The cost of capital is an annualization factor that transforms the price of an
asset into the price of the corresponding capital input24). This includes the nominal
rate of return, the rate of depreciation, and the rate of capital loss due to declining
prices. The cost of capital is an essential concept for the economics of information
technology25), due to the astonishing decline of IT prices given in Table 1.
                                                          
22) See Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000b), Appendix B, for details on the estimates of capital
input.
23) Jorgenson (2000) presents a model of capital as a factor of production. BLS (1983) desc-
ribes the version of this model employed in the official productivity statistics. For a recent upda-
te, see: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/prd3.nr0.htm. Hulten (2001) surveys the literature.
24) Jorgenson and Yun (1991), p. 7.
25) Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995), pp. 300–303.2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 13
  The cost of capital is important in many areas of economics, especially in mode-
ling producer behavior, productivity measurement, and the economics of taxation26).
Many of the important issues in measuring the cost of capital have been debated for
decades. The first of these is incorporation of the rate of decline of asset prices into the
cost of capital. The assumption of perfect foresight or rational expectations quickly
emerged as the  most  appropriate formulation and has been  used in almost  all  ap-
plications of the cost of capital27).
  The second empirical issue is the measurement of economic depreciation. The
stability of patterns of depreciation in the face of changes in tax policy and price
shocks has been carefully documented. The depreciation rates presented by Jorgen-
son and Kevin J. Stiroh (2000b) summarize a large body of empirical research on the
behavior of asset prices28). A third empirical issue is the description of the tax struc-
ture for capital income. This depends on the tax laws prevailing at each point of ti-
me. The resolution of these issues has cleared the way for detailed measurements of
the cost of capital for all assets that appear in the national accounts, including in-
formation technology29).
  The definition of capital includes all tangible assets in the U.S. economy, equip-
ment and structures, as well as consumers’ and government durables, land, and inven-
tories. The capital service flows from durable goods employed by households and go-
vernments enter measures of both output and input. A steadily rising proportion of
these service flows are associated with investments in IT. Investments in IT by busi-
ness, household, and government sectors must be included in the GDP, along with
household and government IT capital services, in order to capture the full impact of IT
on the U.S. economy.
  Table 3 gives capital stocks from 1948 to 1999, as well as price indexes for total
domestic  tangible  assets  and IT  assets – computers,  software,  and  communications
equipment. The estimate of domestic tangible capital stock in Table 3 is $35.4 trillions
in 1999,  considerably  greater  than  the $27.9  trillions  in  fixed  capital  estimated  by
Shelby W. Herman (2000) of BEA. The most important differences reflect the inclusion
of inventories and land in Table 3.
  Business IT investments, as well as purchases of computers, software, and
communications equipment by households and governments, have grown spectacularly
in recent years, but remain relatively small. The stocks of all IT assets combined ac-
count for only 4.35 percent of domestic tangible capital stock in 1999. Table 4 presents
estimates of the flow of capital services and corresponding price indexes for 1948–99.
  The  difference  between  growth  in  capital  services  and  capital  stock  is  the
improvement in capital quality. This represents the substitution towards assets with
higher marginal products. The shift toward IT increases the quality of capital, since
computers, software, and communications equipment have relatively high marginal
products.  Capital  stock  estimates  fail  to  account  for  this  increase  in  quality  and
substantially underestimate the impact of IT investment on growth.
                                                          
26) Lau (2000) surveys applications of the cost of capital.
27) See, for example, Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987), pp. 40–9, and Jorgenson and
Griliches (1996).
28) Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000b), Table B4, pp. 196–7 give the depreciation rates employed in
this study. Fraumeni (1997) describes depreciation rates used in the NIPA. Jorgenson (2000) sur-
veys empirical studies of depreciation.
29) See Jorgenson and Yun (2001). Diewert and Lawrence (2000) survey measures of the pri-
ce and quantity of capital input.14 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
  The growth of capital quality is slightly less than twenty percent of capital in-
put growth for the period 1948–1995. However, improvements in capital quality have
increased steadily in relative importance. These improvements jumped to 44.9 percent
of total growth in capital input during the period 1995–99, reflecting very rapid re-
structuring of capital to take advantage of the sharp acceleration in the IT price dec-
line. Capital stock has become progressively less accurate as a measure of capital input
and is now seriously deficient.
  Chart 5 gives the IT capital service flows as a share of gross domestic income.
The second panel of Table 2 summarizes the growth rates of prices and quantities of
capital  inputs for 1990–5  and 1995–9.  Growth  of IT  capital  services jumps  from
11.51 percent per year in 1990-5 to 19.41 percent in 1995–9, while growth of non-IT
capital services increases from 1.72 percent to 2.94 percent. This reverses the trend
toward slower capital growth through 1995.
 
  C. Labor Services
 
  This section presents estimates of labor input for the U.S. economy from 1948
to 1999. These incorporate individual data from the Censuses of Population for 1970,
1980, and 1990, as well as the annual Current Population Surveys. Constant quality
indexes for the price and quantity of labor input account for the heterogeneity of
the workforce across sex, employment class, age, and education levels. This follows
the approach of Jorgenson, Frank M. Gollop, and Barbara M. Fraumeni (1987). The
estimates have been revised and updated by Mun S. Ho and Jorgenson (2000)30).
  The distinction between  labor input and labor hours is analogous to  the  dis-
tinction between capital services and capital stock. The growth in labor quality is the
difference between the growth in labor input and hours worked. Labor quality reflects
the substitution of workers with high marginal products for those with low marginal
products. Table 5 presents estimates of labor input, hours worked, and labor quality.
  The value of labor expenditures in Table 5 is $5.8 trillions in 1999, 59.3 percent
of the value of output. This share accurately reflects the concept of gross domestic
income,  including  imputations  for  the  value  of  capital  services  in  household  and
government sectors. As shown in Table 7, the growth rate of labor input accelerated
to 2.18 percent for 1995-9 from 1.70 percent for 1990-5. This is primarily due to the
growth of hours worked, which rose from 1.17 percent for 1990-5 to 1.98 percent for
1995-9, as labor force participation increased and unemployment rates plummeted.
  The growth of labor quality has declined considerably in the late 1990's, drop-
ping from 0.53 percent for 1990–5 to 0.20 percent for 1995–9. This slowdown captu-
res well-known demographic trends in the composition of the work force, as well as
exhaustion of the pool of available workers. Growth in hours worked does not cap-
ture these changes in labor quality growth and is a seriously misleading measure of
labor input.
 
  III. The American Growth Resurgence
 
  The  American  economy  has  undergone  a  remarkable  resurgence  since  the
mid-1990's with accelerating growth in output, labor productivity, and total factor
productivity. The purpose of this section is to quantify the sources of growth for
1948-99 and various sub-periods. An important objective is to account for the sharp
                                                          
30) See Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000b), Appendix C, for details on the estimates of labor in-
put. Gollop (2000) discusses the measurement of labor quality.2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 15
acceleration in the level of economic activity since 1995 and, in particular, to docu-
ment the role of information technology.
  The appropriate framework for analyzing the impact of information technology
is the production possibility frontier, giving outputs of IT investment goods as well as
inputs of IT capital services. An important advantage of this framework is that prices
of IT outputs and inputs are linked through the price of IT capital services. This fra-
mework successfully captures the substitutions among outputs and inputs in response
to the rapid deployment of IT. It also encompasses costs of adjustment, while allowing
financial markets to be modeled independently.
  As a consequence of the swift advance of information technology, a number of
the most familiar concepts in growth economics have been superseded. The aggregate
production function heads this list. Capital stock as a measure of capital input is now
longer adequate to capture the rising importance of IT. This completely obscures the
restructuring of capital input that is such an important wellspring of the growth re-
surgence. Finally, hours worked must be replaced as a measure of labor input.
 
  A. Production Possibility Frontier
 
  The production possibility frontier describes efficient combinations of outputs
and inputs for the economy as a whole31). Aggregate output Y consists of outputs of
investment goods and consumption goods. These outputs are produced from aggre-
gate input X, consisting of capital services and labor services. Productivity is a «Hicks-
neutral» augmentation of aggregate input.
  The production possibility frontier takes the form:
 
 
 
 
  where the outputs include non-IT investment goods In and investments in computers
Ic, software Is, and communications equipment It, as well as non-IT  consumption
goods and services Cn and IT capital services to households and governments Cc. In-
puts include non-IT capital services Kn and the services of computers Kc, software
Ks, and telecommunications equipment Kt, as well as labor input L32). Total factor
productivity (TFP) is denoted by A.
  The most important advantage of the production possibility frontier is the ex-
plicit role that it provides for constant quality prices of IT products. These are used
as deflators for nominal expenditures on IT investments to obtain the quantities of
IT outputs. Investments in IT are cumulated into stocks of IT capital. The flow of IT
capital services is an aggregate of these stocks with service prices as weights. Simi-
larly, constant quality prices of IT capital services are used in deflating the nominal
values of consumption of these services.
  Another important advantage of the production possibility frontier is the incor-
poration of costs of adjustment. For example, an increase in the output of IT invest-
ment goods requires foregoing part of the output of consumption goods and non-IT in-
vestment goods, so that adjusting the rate of investment in IT is costly. However, costs
                                                          
31) The production possibility frontier was introduced into productivity measurement by
Jorgenson (1996), pp. 27–28.
32) Services of durable goods to governments and households are included in both inputs
and outputs.
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of adjustment are external to the producing unit and are fully reflected in IT prices.
These prices incorporate forward-looking expectations of the future prices of IT capital
services.
 
  B. Aggregate Production Function
 
  The aggregate production function employed by Robert M. Solow (1957, 1960)
and, more recently, by Jeremy Greenwood, Zvi Hercowitz, and Per Krusell (1997,
2000), Hercowitz (1998), and Arnold C. Harberger (1998) is a competing methodology.
The production function gives a single output as a function of capital and labor inputs.
There is no role for separate prices of investment and consumption goods and, hence,
no place for constant quality IT price indexes for outputs of IT investment goods.
  Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell employ a price index for consumption to
deflate the output of all investment goods, including information technology.
  Confronted by the fact that constant quality prices of investment goods differ
from consumption goods prices, they borrow the concept of embodiment from Solow
(1960) in order to convert investment goods output into an appropriate form for mea-
suring capital stock33). Investment has two prices, one used in the measuring output
and the other used in measuring capital stock. This inconsistency can be removed by
simply distinguishing between outputs of consumption and investment goods, as in the
national accounts and Equation (1). The concept of embodiment can then be dropped.
  Perhaps inadvertently, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussell have revisited the
controversy accompanying the introduction of a constant quality price index for
computers into the national accounts. They have revived Denison's (1993) proposal to
use a consumption price index to deflate investment in the NIPA. Denison found this
appealing as a means of avoiding the introduction of constant quality price indexes
for computers. Denison's approach leads to a serious underestimate of GDP growth
and an overestimate of inflation.
  Another limitation of the aggregate production function is that it fails to incor-
porate costs of adjustment. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., (1967) presented a production model
with internal costs of adjustment. Fumio Hayashi (2000) shows how to identify these
adjustment costs from James Tobin's (1969) Q-ratio, the ratio of the stock market va-
lue of the producing unit to the market value of the unit's assets. Implementation of
this approach requires simultaneous modeling of production and asset valuation. If
costs of adjustment are external, as in the production possibility frontier (1), asset va-
luation can be modeled separately from production34).
 
Ñ. Sources of Growth
Under the assumption that product and factor markets are competitive producer
equilibrium implies that the share-weighted growth of outputs is the sum of the sha-
re-weighted growth of inputs and growth in total factor productivity:
                                                          
33) Whelan (1999) also employs Solow's concept of embodiment.
34) See, for example, Campbell and Shiller (1998).
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where  w  and  v  denote average value shares. The shares of outputs and inputs add
to one under the additional assumption of constant returns,
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Equation (2) makes it possible to identify the contributions of outputs as well
as inputs to U.S. economic growth. The growth rate of output is a weighted average
of growth rates of investment and consumption goods outputs. The contribution of
each output is its weighted growth rate. Similarly, the growth rate of input is a
weighted average of growth rates of capital and labor services and the contribution
of each input is its weighted growth rate. The contribution of TFP, the growth rate
of the augmentation factor A in Equation (2), is the difference between growth rates
of output and input.
Table 6 presents results of a growth accounting decomposition, based on Equa-
tion (2), for the period 1948–99 and various sub-periods, following Jorgenson and Sti-
roh (1999, 2000b). Economic growth is broken down by output and input categories,
quantifying the contribution of information technology to investment and consumption
outputs, as well as capital inputs. These estimates identify computers, software, and
communications equipment as distinct types of information technology.
Rearranging Equation (2), the results can be presented in terms of average la-
bor productivity (ALP), defined as  H Y y / = , the ratio of output Y to hours worked
H, and  H K k / =  is the ratio of capital services K to hours worked:
(3)      ( ) A H L v k v y
L K ln ln ln ln ln D + D - D + D = D .
Equation (3) allocates ALP growth among three sources. The first is capital
deepening, the growth in capital input per hour worked, and reflects the capital-
labor substitution. The second is improvement in labor quality and captures the ri-
sing proportion of hours by workers with higher marginal products. The third is
TFP growth, which contributes point-for-point to ALP growth.
D. Contributions of IT Investment
Chart 5 depicts the rapid increase in the importance of IT services, reflecting
the accelerating pace of IT price declines. In 1995–9 the capital service price for com-
puters fell 24.81 percent per year, compared to an increase of 36.36 percent in capital
input from computers. As a consequence, the value of computer services grew sub-
stantially. However, the current dollar value of computers was only 1.6 percent of
gross domestic income in 1999.
The rapid accumulation of software appears to have different sources. The price
of software services has declined only 2.04 percent per year for 1995–9. Nonetheless,
firms have been accumulating software very rapidly, with real capital services gro-
wing 16.30 percent per year. A possible explanation is that firms respond to computer
price declines by investing in complementary inputs like software. However, a more
plausible explanation is that the price indexes used to deflate software investment fail
to hold quality constant. This leads to an overstatement of inflation and an understa-
tement of growth.
Although the price decline for communications equipment during the period
1995–9 is comparable to that of software, investment in this equipment is more in line18 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
with prices. However, prices of communications equipment also fail to hold quality
constant. The technology of switching equipment, for example, is similar to that of
computers; investment in this category is deflated by a constant-quality price index
developed by BEA. Conventional price deflators are employed for transmission gear,
such as fiber-optic cables. This leads to an underestimate of the growth rates of in-
vestment, capital stock, capital services, and the GDP, as well as an overestimate of
the rate of inflation.
Charts 6 and 7 highlight the rising contributions IT outputs to U.S. economic
growth. Chart 6 shows the breakdown between IT and non-IT outputs for sub-periods
from 1948 to 1999, while Chart 7 decomposes the contribution of IT into its compo-
nents. Although the importance of IT has steadily increased, Chart 6 shows that the
recent investment and consumption surge nearly doubled the output contribution of
IT. Chart 7 shows that computer investment is the largest single IT contributor in the
late 1990's, but that investments in software and communications equipment are
becoming increasingly important.
Charts 8 and 9 present a similar decomposition of IT inputs into production. The
contribution of these inputs is rising even more dramatically. Chart 8 shows that the
contribution of IT now accounts for more than 48.1 percent of the total contribution of
capital input. Chart 9 shows that computer hardware is the largest IT contributor on
the input side, reflecting the growing share and accelerating growth rate of computer
investment in the late 1990's.
Private business investment predominates in the output of IT, as shown by Jor-
genson and Stiroh (1999, 2000b)35). Household purchases of IT equipment and services
are next in importance. Government purchases of IT equipment and services, as well
as net exports of IT products, must be included in order to provide a complete picture.
Firms, consumers, governments, and purchasers of U.S. exports are responding to re-
lative price changes, increasing the contributions of computers, software, and commu-
nications equipment.
Table 2 shows that the price of computer investment fell by more than 32 per-
cent per year, the price of software 2.4 percent, and the price of communications equi-
pment 2.9 percent, and the price of IT services 11.8 percent during the period 1995–9,
while non-IT prices rose 2.2 percent. In response to these price changes, firms, house-
holds, and governments have accumulated computers, software, and communications
equipment much more rapidly than other forms of capital.
E. Total Factor Productivity
The price or «dual» approach to productivity measurement makes it possible to
identify the role of IT production as a source of productivity growth at the industry
level36). The rate of productivity growth is measured as the decline in the price of out-
put, plus a weighted average of the growth rates of input prices with value shares of
the inputs as weights. For the computer industry this expression is dominated by two
terms: the decline in the price of computers and the contribution of the price of semi-
conductors. For the semiconductor industry the expression is dominated by the decline
in the price of semiconductors37).
                                                          
35) Bosworth and Triplett (2000) compare the results of Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000b) with
those of Oliner and Sichel (2000).
36) The dual approach is presented by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987), pp. 53–63.
37) Dulberger (1993), Triplett (1996), and Oliner and Sichel (2000) present models of the rela-
tionships between computer and semiconductor industries. These are special cases of the Domar
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Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) have employed Evsey Domar's (1961)
model to trace aggregate productivity growth to its sources at the level of individual
industries38). More recently, Harberger (1998), William Gullickson and Michael J. Har-
per (1999) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000a, 2000b) have used the model for similar
purposes. Productivity growth for each industry is weighted by the ratio of the gross
output of the industry to GDP to estimate the industry contribution to aggregate TFP
growth.
If semiconductor output were only used to produce computers, then its contri-
bution to computer industry productivity growth, weighted by computer industry out-
put, would precisely cancel its independent contribution to aggregate TFP growth. This
is the ratio of the value of semiconductor output to GDP, multiplied by the rate of se-
miconductor price decline. In fact, semiconductors are used to produce telecommuni-
cations equipment and many other products. However, the value of semiconductor out-
put is dominated by inputs into IT production.
The Domar aggregation formula can be approximated by expressing the de-
clines in prices of computers, communications equipment, and software relative to
the price of gross domestic income, an aggregate of the prices of capital and labor
services. The rates of relative IT price decline are weighted by ratios of the outputs
of IT products to the GDP. Table 8 reports details of this TFP decomposition for
1990–5 and 1995-9; the IT and non-IT contributions are presented in Chart 10. The
IT products contribute 0.50 percentage points to TFP growth for 1995–9, compared
to 0.25 percentage points for 1990–5. This reflects the accelerating decline in relative
price changes resulting from shortening the product cycle for semiconductors.
F. Output Growth
This section presents the sources of GDP growth for the entire period 1948 to
1999. Capital services contribute 1.70 percentage points, labor services 1.14 percentage
points, and TFP growth only 0.61 percentage points.  Input growth is the source of ne-
arly 82.3 percent of U.S. growth over the past half century, while TFP has accounted
for 17.7 percent. Chart 11 shows the relatively modest contributions of TFP in all sub-
periods.
More than three-quarters of the contribution of capital reflects the accumulation
of capital stock, while improvement in the quality of capital accounts for about one-
quarter. Similarly, increased labor hours account for 80 percent of labor’s contribution;
the remainder is due to improvements in labor quality. Substitutions among capital
and labor inputs in response to price changes are essential components of the sources
of economic growth.
A look at the U.S. economy before and after 1973 reveals familiar features of the
historical record. After strong output and TFP growth in the 1950's, 1960's and early
1970's, the U.S. economy slowed markedly through 1990, with output growth falling
from 3.99 percent to 2.86 percent and TFP growth declining from 0.92 percent to 0.25
percent. Growth in capital inputs also slowed from 4.64 percent for 1948–73 to 3.57
percent for 1973-90. This contributed to sluggish ALP growth – 2.82 percent for 1948-
73 and 1.26 percent for 1973–90.
Relative to the early 1990's, output growth increased by 1.72 percent in 1995–9.
The contribution of IT production almost doubled, relative to 1990–5, but still accoun-
                                                          
38) See Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987), pp. 63–66, 301–322.20 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
ted for only 28.9 percent of the increased growth of output. Although the contribution
of IT has increased steadily throughout the period 1948–99, there has been a sharp re-
sponse to the acceleration in the IT price decline in 1995. Nonetheless, more than 70
percent of the increased output growth can be attributed to non-IT products.
Between 1990–5 and 1995–9 the contribution of capital input jumped by 0.95
percentage points, the contribution of labor input rose by only 0.24 percent, and TFP
accelerated by 0.51 percent. Growth in ALP rose 0.92 as more rapid capital deepening
and growth in TFP offset slower improvement in labor quality. Growth in hours wor-
ked accelerated as unemployment fell to a 30-year low. Labor markets have tightened
considerably, even as labor force participation rates increased 39).
The contribution of capital input reflects the investment boom of the late 1990's
as businesses, households, and governments poured resources into plant and equip-
ment, especially computers, software, and communications equipment. The contribu-
tion of capital, predominantly IT, is considerably more important than the contribution
of labor. The contribution of IT capital services has grown steadily throughout the
period 1948–99, but Chart 9 reflects the impact of the accelerating decline in IT prices.
After maintaining an average rate of 0.25 percent for the period 1973-90, TFP
growth fell to 0.24 percent for 1990-5 and then vaulted to 0.75 percent per year for
1995–9. This is a major source of growth in output and ALP for the U.S. economy
(Charts 11 and 12). While TFP growth for 1995-9 is lower than the rate of 1948–73,
the U.S. economy is recuperating from the anemic productivity growth of the past two
decades. Although only half of the acceleration in TFP from 1990–5 to 1995–9 can be
attributed to IT production, this is far greater than the 4.26 percent share of IT in the
GDP.
G. Average Labor Productivity
Output growth is the sum of growth in hours and average labor productivity.
Table 7 shows the breakdown between growth in hours and ALP for the same periods
as in Table 6. For the period 1948–99, ALP growth predominated in output growth,
increasing just over 2 percent per year for 1948–99, while hours increased about 1.4
percent per year. As shown in Equation (3), ALP growth depends on capital deepening,
a labor quality effect, and TFP growth.
Chart 12 reveals the well-known productivity slowdown of the 1970's and
1980's, emphasizing the acceleration in labor productivity growth in the late 1990's.
The slowdown through 1990 reflects reduced capital deepening, declining labor quality
growth, and decelerating growth in TFP. The growth of ALP slipped further during
the early 1990's with a slump in capital deepening only partly offset by a revival in
labor quality growth and an up-tick in TFP growth. A slowdown in hours combined
with slowing ALP growth during 1990–5 to produce a further slide in the growth of
output. In previous cyclical recoveries during the postwar period, output growth acce-
lerated during the recovery, powered by more rapid growth of hours and ALP.
Accelerating output growth during 1995–9 reflects growth in labor hours and
ALP almost equally40). Comparing 1990–5 to 1995–9, the rate of output growth jum-
ped by 1.72 percent – due to an increase in hours worked of 0.81 percent and another
                                                          
39) Katz and Krueger (1999) analyze the recent performance of the U.S. labor market.
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increase in ALP growth of 0.92 percent. Chart 12 shows the acceleration in ALP
growth is due to capital deepening as well as faster TFP growth. Capital deepening
contributed 0.60 percentage points, offsetting a negative contribution of labor quality
of 0.20 percent. The acceleration in TFP added 0.51 percentage points.
H. Research Opportunities
The use of computers, software, and communications equipment must be care-
fully distinguished from the production of IT41). Massive increases in computing po-
wer, like those experienced by the U.S. economy, have two effects on growth. First,
as IT producers become more efficient, more IT equipment and software is produced
from the same inputs. This raises productivity in IT-producing industries and cont-
ributes to TFP growth for the economy as a whole. Labor productivity also grows at
both industry and aggregate levels.
Second, investment in information technology leads to growth of productive
capacity in IT-using industries. Since labor is working with more and better equip-
ment, this increases ALP through capital deepening. If the contributions to aggregate
output are captured by capital deepening, aggregate TFP growth is unaffected 42).
Increasing deployment of IT affects TFP growth only if there are spillovers from IT-
producing industries to IT-using industries.
Top priority must be given to identifying the impact of investment in IT at
the industry level. Stiroh (1998) has shown that this is concentrated in a small num-
ber of IT-using industries, while Stiroh (2000) shows that aggregate ALP growth
can be attributed to productivity growth in IT-producing and IT-using industries.
The next priority is to trace the increase in aggregate TFP growth to its sources in
individual industries. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000a, 2000b) present the appropriate
methodology and preliminary results.
IV. Economics on Internet Time
The steadily rising importance of information technology has created new re-
search opportunities in all areas of economics. Economic historians, led by Alfred D.
Chandler (2000) and Paul A. David (2000)43), have placed the information age in
historical context. The Solow (1987) Paradox, that we see computers everywhere but
in the productivity statistics44), has provided a point of departure. Since computers
have now left an indelible imprint on the productivity statistics, the remaining issue
is whether the breathtaking speed of technological change in semiconductors differ-
entiates this resurgence from previous periods of rapid growth?
Capital and labor markets have been severely impacted by information tech-
nology. Enormous uncertainty surrounds the relationship between equity valuations
and future growth prospects of the American economy45). One theory attributes ris-
                                                          
41) Economics and  Statistics Administration (2000), Table 3.1,  p. 23,  lists IT-producing in-
dustries.
42) Baily and Gordon (1988).
43) See also: David (1990) and Gordon (2000).
44)  Griliches (1994), Brynjolfsson and  Yang (1996),  and  Triplett (1999)  discuss the  Solow
Paradox.
45) Campbell and Shiller (1998) and Shiller (2000) discuss equity valuations and growth pro-
spects. Kiley (1999), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), and Hall (2000), present models of investment
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ing valuations of equities since the growth acceleration began in 1995 to the accu-
mulation of intangible assets, such as intellectual property and organizational capital.
An alternative theory treats the high valuations of technology stocks as a bubble
that burst during the year 2000.
The behavior of labor markets also poses important puzzles. Widening wage dif-
ferentials between workers with more and less education has been attributed to com-
puterization of the workplace. A possible explanation could be that high-skilled wor-
kers are complementary to IT, while low-skilled workers are substitutable. An alter-
native explanation is that technical change associated with IT is skill-biased and in-
creases the wages of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers 46).
Finally, information technology is altering product markets and business orga-
nizations, as attested by the large and growing business literature47), but a fully satis-
factory model of the semiconductor industry remains to be developed48). Such a model
would derive the demand for semiconductors from investment in information techno-
logy in response to rapidly falling IT prices. An important objective is to determine the
product cycle for successive generations of new semiconductors endogenously.
The semiconductor industry and the information technology industries are global
in their scope with an elaborate international division of labor49). This poses important
questions about the American growth resurgence. Where is the evidence of a new
economy in other leading industrialized countries? An important explanation is the ab-
sence of constant quality price indexes for semiconductors and information technology
in national accounting systems outside the U.S.50) Another conundrum is that several
important participants – Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan – are «newly indu-
strializing» economies. What does this portend for developing countries like China and
India?
As policy-makers attempt to fill the widening gaps between the information
required for sound policy and the available data, the traditional division of labor
between statistical agencies and policy-making bodies is breaking down.
In the mean time monetary policy-makers must set policies without accurate
measures of price change. Similarly, fiscal policy-makers confront on-going revisions of
growth projections that drastically affect the outlook for future tax revenues and gov-
ernment spending.
The stagflation of the 1970's greatly undermined the Keynesian Revolution,
leading to a New Classical Counter-revolution led by Lucas (1981) that has trans-
formed macroeconomics. The unanticipated American growth revival of the 1990's
has similar potential for altering economic perspectives. In fact, this is already fore-
shadowed in a steady stream of excellent books on the economics of information
technology51). We are the fortunate beneficiaries of a new agenda for economic re-
search that could refresh our thinking and revitalize our discipline.
                                                          
46) Acemoglu (2000) and Katz (2000) survey the literature on labor markets and technological
change.
47) See, for example, Grove (1996) on the market for computers and semiconductors and
Christensen (1997) on the market for storage devices.
48) Irwin and Klenow (1994), Flamm (1996), pp. 305–424, and Helpman and Trajtenberg
(1998), pp. 111–119, present models of the semiconductor industry.
49) The role of information technology in U.S. economic growth is discussed by the Econo-
mics and Statistics Administration (2000); comparisons among OECD countries are given by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2000).
50) The measurement gap between the U.S. and other OECD countries was first identified
by Wykoff (1995). Schreyer (2000) has taken the initial steps to fill this gap.
51) See, for example, Shapiro and Varian (1999), Brynjolfsson and Kahin (2000), and Choi
and Whinston (2000).2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 23
*          *
*
REFERENCES
1. Acemoglu, Daron, "Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market," Cambridge,
MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 2000.
2. Baily, Martin N., and Gordon, Robert J., "The Productivity Slowdown, Measurement
Issues, and the Explosion of Computer Power," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988,
2, pp. 347–420.
3. Berndt, Ernst R., The Practice of Econometrics: Classic and Contemporary, Reading,
MA: Addison–Wesley, 1991.
4. Bosworth, Barry P., and Triplett, Jack E., "What's New About the New Economy? IT,
Growth and Productivity," Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 20, 2000.
5. Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Hitt, Lorin M., "Beyond Computation: Information Technol-
ogy, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance," Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 14(4), Fall 2000, pp. 23–48.
6. Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Kahin, Brian,  Understanding the Digital Economy, Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000.
7. Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Yang, Shinkyu, "Information Technology and Productivity:
A Review of the Literature," Advances in Computers, 43(1), February 1996, pp. 179–214.
8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Trends in Multifactor Productivity, 1948–1981, Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983.
9.  Campbell, John Y., and Shiller, Robert J., "Valuation Ratios and the Long-run Stock
Market Outlook," Journal of Portfolio Management, 24(2), Winter 1998, pp. 11–26.
10.   Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., "The Information Age in Historical Perspective," in Alfred
D. Chandler and James W. Cortada, A Nation Transformed by Information: How Information
Has Shaped the United States from Colonial Times to the Present, New York, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2000, pp. 3–38.
11.   Choi, Soon–Yong, and Whinston, Andrew B. The Internet Economy: Technology and
Practice, Austin, TX: SmartEcon Publishing, 2000.
12.   Chow, Gregory C., "Technological Change and the Demand for Computers," Ameri-
can Economic Review, 57(5), December 1967, pp. 1117–30.
13.   Christensen, Clayton M., The Innovator's Dilemma, Boston, Harvard Business School
Press, 1997.
14.    Cole, Rosanne, Chen, Y.C., Barquin-Stolleman, Joan A., Dulberger, Ellen R. Hel-
vacian, Nurthan, and Hodge, James H., "Quality-Adjusted Price Indexes for Computer Proces-
sors and Selected Peripheral Equipment," Survey of Current Business, 66(1), January 1986, pp.
41–50.
15.   Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2000.
16.   Council of Economic Advisers, Annual Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, February 2000.
17.   David, Paul A., "The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the
Productivity Paradox," American Economic Review, 80(2), May 1990, pp. 355–61.
18.   _____, "Understanding Digital Technology's Evolution and the Path of Measured
Productivity Growth: Present and Future in the Mirror of the Past," in Brynjolfsson and Ka-
hin (2000), pp. 49–98.
19.   Denison, Edward F., "Theoretical Aspects of Quality Change, Capital Consumption,
and Net Capital Formation," in Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, Problems of
Capital Formation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 215–61.24 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
20.   _____, Estimates of Productivity Change by Industry, Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 1989.
21.    _____, "Robert J. Gordon's Concept of Capital,"  Review of Income and Wealth,
39(1), March 1993, pp. 89–102.
22.   Diewert, W. Erwin, "Exact and Superlative Index Numbers," Journal of Economet-
rics, 4(2), May 1976, pp. 115–46.
23.   Diewert, W. Erwin, and Lawrence, Denis A., "Progress in Measuring the Price and
Quantity of Capital," in Lau (2000), pp. 273–326.
24.   Domar, Evsey, "On the Measurement of Technological Change," Economic Journal,
71(284), December 1961, pp. 709–29.
25.    Dulberger, Ellen R., "The Application of a Hedonic Model to a Quality-Adjusted
Price Index for Computer Processors," in Jorgenson and Landau (1989), pp. 37–76.
26.    _____, "Sources of Decline in Computer Processors: Selected Electronic Compo-
nents," in Murray F. Foss, Marilyn E. Manser, and Allan H. Young, eds., Price Measurements
and Their Uses, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, pp. 103–24.
27.   Economics and Statistics Administration, Digital Economy 2000, Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Commerce, June 2000.
28.   Fisher, Irving, The Making of Index Numbers, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1922.
29.   Flamm, Kenneth, "Technological Advance and Costs: Computers versus Communica-
tions," in Robert C. Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, eds., Changing the Rules: Technological
Change, International Competition, and Regulation in Communications, Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 1989, pp. 13–61.
30.   _____,  Mismanaged Trade? Strategic Policy and the Semiconductor Industry,
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996.
31.   Fraumeni, Barbara M., "The Measurement of Depreciation in the U.S. National I n-
come and Product Accounts," Survey of Current Business, 77(7), July 1997, pp. 7–23.
32.   Gollop, Frank M., "The Cost of Capital and the Measurement of Productivity," in
Lau (2000), pp. 85–110.
33.   Gordon, Robert J., "The Postwar Evolution of Computer Prices," in Jorgenson and
Landau (1989), pp. 77–126.
34.   _____, The Measurement of Durable Goods Prices, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1990.
35.   _____, "Foundations of the Goldilocks Economy: Supply Shocks and the Time-
Varying NAIRU," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998, 2, pp. 297–333.
36.   _____, "Does the 'New Economy' Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), Fall 2000, pp. 49–74.
37.   Greenspan, Alan, "Challenges for Monetary Policy-Makers," Washington, DC: Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 19, 2000.
38.   Greenwood, Jeremy, Hercowitz, Zvi, and Krusell, Per, "Long-run Implications of In-
vestment-specific Technological Change,"  American Economic Review, 87(3), June 1997,
pp. 342–62.
39.   _____, _____, and _____, "The Role of Investment-specific Technological Change in
the Business Cycle," European Economic Review, 44(1), January 2000, pp. 91–115.
40.   Griliches, Zvi, "Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint," American Economic
Review, 94(2), March 1994, pp. 1–23.
41.   Grimm, Bruce T., "Quality Adjusted Price Indexes for Digital Telephone Switches,"
Washington, DC: Bureau of Economic Analysis, May 20, 1997.
42.   _____, "Price Indexes for Selected Semiconductors: 1974–96," Survey of Current
Business, February 1998, 78(2), pp. 8–24.
43.   Grove, Andrew S., Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points that
Challenge Every Company, New York, Doubleday, 1996.2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 25
44.   Gullickson, William, and Harper, Michael J., "Possible Measurement Bias in Aggre-
gate Productivity Growth," Monthly Labor Review, 122(2), February 1999, pp. 47–67.
45.   Hall, Robert E., "e-Capital: The Link between the Stock Market and the Labor Market
in the 1990's," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2000, 2, forthcoming.
46.   Harberger, Arnold C., "A Vision of the Growth Process," American Economic Review,
88(1), March 1998, pp. 1–32.
47.   Hayashi, Fumio, "The Cost of Capital, Q, and the Theory of Investment Demand," in
Lau (2000), pp. 55–84.
48.   Hecht, Jeff, City of Light, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999a.
49.   Helpman, Elhanan, and Trajtenberg, Manuel, "Diffusion of General Purpose Tech-
nologies," in Elhanan Helpman, ed.,  General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 85–120.
50.   Hercowitz, Zvi, "The 'Embodiment' Controversy: A Review Essay," Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 41(1), February 1998, pp. 217–24.
51.   Herman, Shelby W., "Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods for 1925–99," Sur-
vey of Current Business, 80(9), September 2000, pp. 19–30.
52.   Ho, Mun S., and Jorgenson, Dale W., "The Quality of the U.S. Workforce, 1948–99,"
Cambridge, MA: Department of Economics, Harvard University, 2000.
53.   Hulten, Charles R., "Total Factor Productivity: A Short Biography," in Charles R.
Hulten, Edwin R. Dean, and Michael J. Harper, eds.,  New Developments in Productivity
Analysis, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001, forthcoming.
54.   International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors, 2000 Update, Austin, TX:
Sematech Corporation, December 2000.
55.   Irwin, Douglas A., and Klenow, Peter J., "Learning-by-Doing Spillovers in the Semi-
conductor Industry," Journal of Political Economy, 102(6), December 1994, pp. 1200–27.
56.   Jorgenson, Dale W.,  Postwar U.S. Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1996.
57.   _____, Capital Theory and Investment Behavior, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1997.
58.   _____, Econometrics and Producer Behavior, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000.
59.   Jorgenson, Dale W., Gollop, Frank M., and Fraumeni, Barbara M., Productivity and
U.S. Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.
60.   Jorgenson, Dale W., and Griliches, Zvi, "The Explanation of Productivity Change,"
in Jorgenson (1996), pp. 51–98.
61.   Jorgenson, Dale W., and Landau, Ralph, eds., Technology and Capital Formation,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989.
62.   Jorgenson, Dale W., and Stiroh, Kevin J., "Computers and Growth," Economics of
Innovation and New Technology, 3(3–4), 1995, pp. 295–316.
63.   _____ and _____, "Information Technology and Growth," American Economic Re-
view, 89(2), May 1999, pp. 109–15.
64.   _____ and _____, "U.S. Economic Growth and the Industry Level," American Eco-
nomic Review, 90(2), May 2000a, pp. 161–7.
65.   _____ and _____, "Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. Economic Growth in the Infor-
mation Age," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2000b, 1, pp. 125–211.
66.   Jorgenson, Dale W., and Yun, Kun-Young, Tax Reform and the Cost of Capital, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
67.   _____ and _____, Lifting the Burden: Tax Reform, the Cost of Capital, and U.S.
Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001.
68.   Katz, Lawrence F., "Technological Change, Computerization, and the Wage Struc-
ture," in Brynjolfsson and Kahin (2000), pp. 217–44.
69.   Katz, Lawrence F., and Krueger, Alan, "The High-Pressure U.S. Labor Market of the
1990's," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1999, 1, pp. 1–87.26 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
70.   Kiley, Michael T., "Computers and Growth with Costs of Adjustment: Will the Fu-
ture Look Like the Past?" Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
July 1999.
71.   Konus, A. A., and Byushgens, S. S., "On the Problem of the Purchasing Power of
Money," Economic Bulletin of the Conjuncture Institute, Supplement, 1926, pp. 151–72.
72.   Landefeld, J. Steven, and Parker, Robert P., "BEA's Chain Indexes, Time Series, and
Measures of Long-Term Growth," Survey of Current Business, 77(5), May 1997, pp. 58–68.
73.   Lau, Lawrence J., ed., Econometrics and the Cost of Capital, Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 2000.
74.   Lucas, Robert E., Jr., "Adjustment Costs and the Theory of Supply," Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 75(4), part 1, August 1967, pp. 321–34.
75.   _____, Studies in Business–Cycle Theory, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981.
76.   Moore, Gordon E., "Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits," Electon-
ics, 38(8), April 19, 1965, pp. 114–7.
77.   _____, "Intel – Memories and the Microprocessor," Daedalus, 125(2), Spring 1996,
pp. 55–80.
78.   _____, "An Update on Moore's Law," Santa Clara, CA: Intel Corporation, September
30, 1997.
79.   Moulton, Brent R., "Improved Estimates of the National Income and Product A c-
counts for 1929–99: Results of the Comprehensive Revision," Survey of Current Business,
80(4), April 2000, pp. 11–7, 36–145.
80.   Organisation for Economic Co–operation and Development, A New Economy? Paris:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2000.
81.   Oliner, Stephen D., and Sichel, Daniel E., "Computers and Output Growth Revisited:
How Big is the Puzzle?" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1994, 2, pp. 273–317.
82.   _____ and _____, "The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990's: Is Information
Technology the Story?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), Fall 2000, pp. 3–22.
83.   Parker, Robert P., and Grimm, Bruce T., "Recognition of Business and Government
Expenditures on Software as Investment: Methodology and Quantitative Impacts, 1959–98,"
Washington, DC: Bureau of Economic Analysis, November 14, 2000.
84.   Petzold, Charles, Code: The Hidden Language of Computer Hardware and Software,
Redmond, WA: Microsoft Press, 1999.
85.   Rashad, Rick, "The Future – It Isn't What It Used to Be," Seattle, WA: Microsoft
Research, May 3, 2000.
86.   Ruttan, Vernon W., "The Computer and Semiconductor Industries,"  Technology,
Growth, and Development, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 316–67.
87.   Schreyer, Paul, "The Contribution of Information and Communication Technology to
Output Growth: A Study of the G7 Countries," Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, May 23, 2000.
88.   Shapiro, Carl, and Varian, Hal R.,  Information Rules, Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 1999.
89.   Shiller, Robert,  Irrational Exuberance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2000.
90.   Solow, Robert M., "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function," Re-
view of Economics and Statistics, 39(3), August 1957, pp. 312–20.
91.   _____, "Investment and Technical Progress," in Kenneth J. Arrow, Samuel Karlin,
and Patrick Suppes, Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959, Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 1960, pp. 89–104.
92.   _____, "We'd Better Watch Out," New York Review of Books, July 12, 1987.
93.   Stiroh, Kevin J. "Computers, Productivity, and Input Substitution," Economic In-
quiry, 36(2), April 1998, pp. 175–91.
94.   _____, "Information Technology and the U.S. Productivity Revival: What Does the
Industry Data Say?" New York, NY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December 2000.2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 27
95.   Tobin, James, "A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory," Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 1(1), February 1969, pp. 15–29.
96.   Triplett, Jack E., "The Economic Interpretation of Hedonic Methods," Survey of Cur-
rent Business, 66(1), January 1986, pp. 36–40.
97.   _____, "Price and Technological Change in a Capital Good: Survey of Research on
Computers," in Jorgenson and Landau (1989), pp. 127–213.
98.   _____, "High-tech Industry Productivity and Hedonic Price Indices," in Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, Industry Productivity, Paris: Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996, pp. 119–42.
99.   _____, "The Solow Productivity Paradox: What Do Computers Do to Productivity?"
Canadian Journal of Economics, 32(2), April 1999, pp. 309–34.
100.   Whelan, Karl, "Computers, Obsolescence, and Productivity," Washington, DC: Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 1999.
101.   Wolfe, Tom, "Two Men Who Went West," Hooking Up, New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 2000, pp. 17–65.
102.   Wykoff, Andrew W., "The Impact of Computer Prices on International Compari-
sons of Productivity," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 3(3–4), 1995, pp. 277–93.
103.    Young, Allan, "BEA's Measurement of Computer Output,"  Survey of Current
Business, 69(7), July 1989, pp. 108–15.28 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
Appendix
Table 1: Information Technology Output and Gross Domestic Product
Year Computer Software Communications IT Services Total IT Gross Domestic
Product
Value Price Value Price Value Price Value Price Value Price Value Price
1948 1,8 0,81 0,4 3,26 2,3 2,47 307,7 0,19
1949 1,7 0,81 0,4 2,19 2,0 2,29 297,0 0,18
1950 1,9 0,83 0,6 2,38 2,5 2,38 339,0 0,19
1951 2,2 0,86 0,8 2,30 3,0 2,43 370,6 0,19
1952 2,7 0,84 1,1 2,50 3,9 2,43 387,4 0,19
1953 3,0 0,80 1,5 2,56 4,5 2,38 418,2 0,20
1954 2,7 0,81 1,3 1,86 3,9 2,15 418,3 0,20
1955 3,0 0,81 1,8 2,25 4,7 2,30 461,3 0,20
1956 3,7 0,82 2,0 2,27 5,7 2,33 484,7 0,21
1957 4,3 0,85 1,9 1,79 6,2 2,22 503,6 0,21
1958 3,8 0,86 2,1 1,84 5,9 2,25 507,2 0,22
1959 0,0 662,98 4,7 0,86 2,7 2,14 7,4 2,37 551,9 0,22
1960 0,2 662,98 0,1 0,58 5,1 0,84 2,8 1,99 8,2 2,28 564,9 0,22
1961 0,3 497,23 0,2 0,59 5,6 0,82 2,8 1,88 9,0 2,19 581,8 0,22
1962 0,3 350,99 0,2 0,59 6,2 0,82 3,3 1,99 10,0 2,20 623,3 0,22
1963 0,8 262,69 0,5 0,59 6,2 0,81 3,3 1,81 10,8 2,08 666,9 0,23
1964 1,0 218,30 0,6 0,57 6,9 0,79 3,6 1,76 12,1 2,01 726,5 0,24
1965 1,3 179,45 0,9 0,58 8,1 0,78 4,7 1,99 15,0 2,03 795,1 0,25
1966 1,9 126,16 1,2 0,54 9,7 0,76 5,2 1,85 18,0 1,88 871,3 0,25
1967 2,1 102,41 1,5 0,58 10,7 0,76 5,0 1,50 19,3 1,75 918,2 0,26
1968 2,1 87,48 1,6 0,58 11,6 0,78 5,4 1,40 20,7 1,71 973,0 0,26
1969 2,7 79,16 2,3 0,63 13,0 0,79 5,8 1,31 23,8 1,70 1045,8 0,27
1970 3,0 71,13 3,1 0,70 14,4 0,81 6,7 1,34 27,1 1,73 1105,2 0,29
1971 3,1 54,17 3,2 0,69 14,7 0,83 8,1 1,47 29,0 1,73 1178,8 0,30
1972 3,9 43,67 3,7 0,70 15,6 0,85 9,0 1,48 32,2 1,72 1336,2 0,32
1973 3,9 41,39 4,3 0,72 18,2 0,86 12,1 1,78 38,4 1,82 1502,5 0,34
1974 4,3 33,80 5,3 0,77 19,9 0,90 10,9 1,45 40,4 1,73 1605,9 0,37
1975 4,0 31,27 6,6 0,83 21,3 0,96 12,0 1,46 43,9 1,79 1785,8 0,41
1976 4,9 26,12 7,1 0,85 23,8 0,98 14,2 1,58 50,0 1,83 2017,5 0,44
1977 6,3 22,72 7,5 0,87 28,1 0,97 22,5 2,28 64,4 2,02 2235,7 0,46
1978 8,5 15,44 9,2 0,90 32,7 0,99 20,3 1,86 70,6 1,85 2517,7 0,49
1979 11,4 12,81 11,9 0,94 38,4 1,02 26,5 2,18 88,2 1,92 2834,9 0,54
1980 14,0 9,97 14,5 1,00 43,9 1,07 23,5 1,73 95,9 1,80 2964,5 0,57
1981 19,2 8,75 17,8 1,08 48,6 1,13 22,4 1,46 108,0 1,76 3285,2 0,62
1982 22,0 7,80 21,1 1,12 50,9 1,17 25,6 1,49 119,5 1,77 3445,4 0,66
1983 28,8 6,44 24,9 1,13 55,0 1,17 29,5 1,50 138,1 1,71 3798,8 0,70
1984 37,4 5,24 30,4 1,15 62,9 1,18 33,3 1,44 163,9 1,63 4288,1 0,74
1985 39,6 4,48 35,2 1,15 69,9 1,17 38,5 1,44 183,1 1,57 4542,6 0,75
1986 45,9 4,45 38,5 1,13 72,7 1,17 42,7 1,36 199,7 1,54 4657,4 0,74
1987 48,6 3,93 43,7 1,14 74,9 1,15 50,3 1,37 217,5 1,50 5078,1 0,78
1988 54,1 3,72 51,2 1,15 82,1 1,14 59,3 1,40 246,7 1,48 5652,0 0,83
1989 56,9 3,52 61,4 1,13 85,1 1,13 63,0 1,31 266,3 1,43 5988,8 0,85
1990 52,4 3,09 69,3 1,12 86,5 1,12 68,5 1,28 276,6 1,38 6284,9 0,88
1991 52,6 2,85 78,2 1,13 83,9 1,12 67,5 1,13 282,2 1,32 6403,3 0,90
1992 54,9 2,44 83,9 1,06 88,1 1,11 77,3 1,15 304,1 1,27 6709,9 0,92
1993 54,8 2,02 95,5 1,06 92,6 1,09 84,7 1,11 327,6 1,21 6988,8 0,93
1994 57,6 1,80 104,6 1,04 102,6 1,07 96,6 1,12 361,4 1,17 7503,9 0,96
1995 70,5 1,41 115,7 1,03 112,4 1,03 108,7 1,10 407,2 1,11 7815,3 0,97
1996 78,3 1,00 131,0 1,00 120,1 1,00 115,1 1,00 444,5 1,00 8339,0 1,00
1997 86,0 0,73 158,1 0,97 131,5 0,98 123,0 0,90 498,7 0,91 9009,4 1,04
1998 86,9 0,53 193,3 0,94 140,4 0,95 131,9 0,79 552,5 0,82 9331,1 1,03
1999 92,4 0,39 241,2 0,94 158,1 0,92 140,9 0,69 632,6 0,75 9817,4 1,04
Notes: Values are in billions of current dollars. Price are normalized to one in 1996. Information
technology output is gross domestic product by type of product.2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 29
Table 2: Growth Rates of Outputs and Inputs
1990-95 1995-99
Prices Quantities Prices Quantities
Outputs
Gross Domestic Product 1,99 2,36 1,62 4,08
Information Technology -4,42 12,15 -9,74 20,75
Computers -15,77 21,71 -32,09 38,87
Software -1,62 11,86 -2,43 20,80
Communications Equipment -1,77 7,01 -2,90 11,42
Information Technology Services -2,95 12,19 -11,76 18,24
Non-Information Technology Investment 2,15 1,22 2,20 4,21
Non-Information Technology Consumption 2,35 2,06 2,31 2,79
Inputs
Gross Domestic Income 2,23 2,13 2,36 3,33
Information Technology Capital Services -2,70 11,51 -10,46 19,41
Computer Capital Services -11,71 20,27 -24,81 36,36
Software Capital Services -1,83 12,67 -2,04 16,30
Communications Equipment Capital Services 2,18 5,45 -5,90 8,07
Non-Information Technology Capital Services 1,53 1,72 2,48 2,94
Labor Services 3,02 1,70 3,39 2,18
Notes: Average annual percentage rates of growth.30 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
Table 3:  Information Technology Capital Stock and Domestic Tangible Assets
Year Computer Software Communications Total IT Total Domestic
Tangible Assets
Value Price Value Price Value Price Value Price Value Price
1948 4,7 0,81 4,7 1,37 711,7 0,13
1949 5,9 0,82 5,9 1,37 750,5 0,13
1950 7,3 0,84 7,3 1,41 824,5 0,13
1951 9,0 0,87 9,0 1,46 948,1 0,14
1952 10,6 0,84 10,6 1,41 1017,5 0,14
1953 12,2 0,81 12,2 1,36 1094,9 0,15
1954 13,7 0,81 13,7 1,37 1146,9 0,15
1955 15,2 0,81 15,2 1,36 1238,4 0,15
1956 17,5 0,82 17,5 1,38 1373,2 0,16
1957 20,7 0,86 20,7 1,44 1494,1 0,17
1958 22,5 0,86 22,5 1,45 1562,3 0,17
1959 0,2 752,87 0,1 0,54 24,7 0,86 25,0 1,45 1655,7 0,18
1960 0,2 752,87 0,1 0,54 26,5 0,84 26,8 1,42 1755,3 0,18
1961 0,5 564,66 0,3 0,55 28,8 0,83 29,5 1,39 1854,8 0,18
1962 0,6 398,58 0,4 0,55 31,7 0,83 32,7 1,38 1982,7 0,19
1963 1,1 298,31 0,8 0,56 33,8 0,81 35,7 1,34 2088,5 0,19
1964 1,6 247,90 1,1 0,55 36,4 0,79 39,1 1,31 2177,3 0,19
1965 2,2 203,79 1,6 0,55 40,0 0,78 43,8 1,28 2315,4 0,20
1966 2,9 143,27 2,3 0,52 44,5 0,76 49,7 1,22 2512,1 0,20
1967 3,7 116,30 3,2 0,56 50,8 0,77 57,6 1,22 2 693,3 0,21
1968 4,3 99,34 3,8 0,56 57,7 0,79 65,7 1,23 2 986,0 0,22
1969 5,3 89,90 5,1 0,61 65,4 0,80 75,7 1,25 3 319,1 0,24
1970 6,2 80,77 7,0 0,68 74,4 0,83 87,5 1,29 3595,0 0,25
1971 6,3 61,52 7,9 0,67 82,1 0,84 96,3 1,28 3922,6 0,26
1972 7,3 49,59 9,1 0,67 90,6 0,86 107,0 1,29 4396,8 0,28
1973 8,6 47,00 10,7 0,69 99,9 0,88 119,2 1,31 4960,3 0,31
1974 9,1 38,38 13,2 0,75 112,8 0,91 135,0 1,35 5391,6 0,32
1975 9,7 35,51 16,3 0,80 128,7 0,98 154,6 1,43 6200,5 0,36
1976 10,4 29,66 18,3 0,82 142,1 1,01 170,7 1,45 6750,0 0,38
1977 12,4 25,81 20,4 0,84 152,3 0,99 185,1 1,42 7574,4 0,41
1978 14,1 17,46 23,5 0,87 171,8 1,02 209,4 1,42 8644,9 0,46
1979 19,3 14,47 28,7 0,91 195,0 1,04 243,0 1,43 9996,7 0,51
1980 24,2 11,27 35,3 0,97 225,7 1,09 285,2 1,47 11371,0 0,56
1981 33,6 9,90 43,6 1,04 260,9 1,15 338,1 1,53 13002,5 0,63
1982 42,4 8,84 52,0 1,08 290,0 1,19 384,3 1,55 13964,7 0,66
1983 52,6 7,32 60,6 1,09 314,3 1,20 427,5 1,53 14526,0 0,68
1984 66,2 5,95 72,3 1,11 344,8 1,20 483,3 1,50 15831,0 0,71
1985 77,7 5,08 84,2 1,11 375,0 1,20 537,0 1,46 17548,6 0,77
1986 86,0 4,34 94,9 1,10 404,3 1,18 585,1 1,41 18 844,3 0,80
1987 94,1 3,71 108,5 1,11 434,8 1,17 637,4 1,37 20216,2 0,84
1988 107,2 3,45 125,2 1,12 467,7 1,16 700,0 1,35 21880,1 0,89
1989 121,0 3,23 144,4 1,11 499,7 1,15 765,1 1,33 23618,7 0,93
1990 122,3 2,89 165,2 1,10 527,1 1,14 814,5 1,29 24335,1 0,94
1991 124,6 2,58 189,9 1,10 548,3 1,13 862,8 1,27 24825,7 0,95
1992 128,2 2,17 203,8 1,04 569,7 1,11 901,7 1,21 25146,8 0,95
1993 135,6 1,82 231,8 1,05 589,5 1,10 956,9 1,17 25660,4 0,95
1994 150,4 1,61 255,8 1,02 612,8 1,07 1019,0 1,13 26301,0 0,95
1995 170,3 1,33 286,7 1,03 634,1 1,03 1091,1 1,07 27858,4 0,98
1996 181,6 1,00 318,1 1,00 659,3 1,00 1158,9 1,00 29007,9 1,00
1997 198,7 0,76 365,2 0,97 695,8 0,98 1259,7 0,94 30895,3 1,04
1998 210,0 0,55 431,2 0,95 730,9 0,94 1372,1 0,87 32888,5 1,07
1999 232,4 0,41 530,6 0,95 778,5 0,90 1541,5 0,81 35406,9 1,11
Notes: Values are in billions of current dollars. Prices are normalized to one in 1996. Domestic
tangible assets include fixed assets and consumer durable goods, land, and inventories.2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 31
Table 4: Information Technology Capital Services and Gross Domestic Income
Year Computer Software Communications Total IT Gross Domestic
Income
Value Price Value Price Value Price Value Price Value Price
1948 1,7 1,20 1,7 4,31 307,7 0,14
1949 1,3 0,79 1,3 2,83 297,0 0,14
1950 1,8 0,91 1,8 3,27 339,0 0,15
1951 2,1 0,90 2,1 3,21 370,6 0,15
1952 2,6 0,94 2,6 3,36 387,4 0,15
1953 3,2 0,96 3,2 3,46 418,2 0,15
1954 2,7 0,70 2,7 2,49 418,3 0,15
1955 3,6 0,85 3,6 3,05 461,3 0,16
1956 4,2 0,87 4,2 3,12 484,7 0,17
1957 3,7 0,68 3,7 2,44 503,6 0,17
1958 4,1 0,68 4,1 2,45 507,2 0,17
1959 0,2 444,36 0,1 0,63 5,2 0,80 5,5 2,87 551,9 0,18
1960 0,2 433,59 0,1 0,62 5,4 0,75 5,6 2,68 564,9 0,18
1961 0,3 637,21 0,1 0,58 5,6 0,71 6,0 2,59 581,8 0,18
1962 0,4 508,68 0,2 0,62 6,6 0,76 7,2 2,71 623,3 0,19
1963 0,6 311,81 0,3 0,58 6,5 0,67 7,3 2,34 666,9 0,20
1964 0,8 211,28 0,4 0,60 7,1 0,67 8,3 2,26 726,5 0,21
1965 1,3 182,17 0,6 0,59 9,1 0,78 11,0 2,52 795,1 0,22
1966 2,2 173,57 1,0 0,64 9,6 0,73 12,8 2,40 871,3 0,23
1967 2,3 110,97 1,1 0,50 9,8 0,66 13,2 2,01 918,2 0,23
1968 2,6 87,05 1,6 0,60 10,2 0,61 14,5 1,86 973,0 0,24
1969 2,8 68,23 1,7 0,52 11,3 0,61 15,8 1,76 1045,8 0,25
1970 3,6 65,38 2,3 0,56 13,3 0,65 19,1 1,83 1105,2 0,26
1971 5,2 72,48 3,7 0,77 14,9 0,67 23,9 1,99 1178,8 0,27
1972 4,9 48,57 4,0 0,71 16,6 0,69 25,4 1,85 1336,2 0,30
1973 4,4 33,06 4,5 0,71 22,8 0,88 31,7 2,04 1502,5 0,32
1974 6,6 38,82 5,1 0,70 20,3 0,72 32,0 1,84 1605,9 0,34
1975 5,9 28,43 6,7 0,80 23,2 0,77 35,7 1,85 1785,8 0,37
1976 6,6 26,07 7,7 0,81 25,0 0,78 39,2 1,84 2017,5 0,41
1977 7,0 20,69 8,4 0,82 41,8 1,20 57,2 2,40 2235,7 0,44
1978 11,8 22,49 9,7 0,86 35,5 0,93 57,0 2,07 2517,7 0,47
1979 11,6 13,33 11,6 0,90 47,9 1,14 71,1 2,15 2834,9 0,51
1980 16,6 11,81 13,6 0,91 42,0 0,90 72,2 1,82 2964,5 0,53
1981 17,7 7,89 15,5 0,90 40,5 0,79 73,6 1,53 3285,2 0,58
1982 19,6 5,93 17,6 0,89 43,1 0,77 80,3 1,41 3445,4 0,60
1983 26,4 5,46 20,6 0,91 49,4 0,82 96,4 1,43 3798,8 0,66
1984 36,1 4,87 25,4 0,96 54,3 0,83 115,7 1,41 4288,1 0,71
1985 39,6 3,70 30,6 0,99 63,1 0,89 133,3 1,35 4542,6 0,73
1986 43,1 3,04 35,3 0,99 69,3 0,89 147,6 1,27 4657,4 0,73
1987 53,4 2,93 42,1 1,04 86,5 1,02 181,9 1,36 5078,1 0,77
1988 52,7 2,31 50,5 1,10 104,1 1,14 207,3 1,36 5652,0 0,81
1989 57,6 2,08 60,4 1,13 105,8 1,07 223,8 1,29 5988,8 0,84
1990 64,7 2,01 67,2 1,08 109,8 1,04 241,7 1,25 6284,9 0,86
1991 64,2 1,76 70,8 1,00 104,2 0,93 239,2 1,12 6403,3 0,88
1992 71,7 1,66 89,9 1,11 112,2 0,96 273,7 1,16 6709,9 0,91
1993 77,8 1,45 90,4 0,98 126,9 1,03 295,1 1,11 6988,8 0,92
1994 80,1 1,19 109,5 1,05 142,4 1,10 331,9 1,10 7503,9 0,96
1995 99,3 1,12 115,5 0,99 160,7 1,16 375,6 1,09 7815,3 0,96
1996 123,6 1,00 131,9 1,00 149,0 1,00 404,5 1,00 8339,0 1,00
1997 134,7 0,76 156,2 1,02 157,1 0,98 448,1 0,92 9009,4 1,04
1998 152,5 0,59 178,2 0,97 162,0 0,93 492,6 0,82 9331,1 1,04
1999 157,7 0,42 204,4 0,91 175,3 0,91 537,4 0,72 9817,4 1,06
Notes:  Values are in billions of current dollars. Prices are normalized to one in 1996.32 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
Table 5: Labor Services
Year Labor Services Employment Weekly Hourly Hours
Price Quantity Value Quality Hours Compensation Worked
1948 0,08 1924,6 156,1 0,75 61536 39,1 1,2 125127
1949 0,09 1860,0 171,5 0,75 60437 38,5 1,4 121088
1950 0,09 1961,0 179,2 0,76 62424 38,5 1,4 125144
1951 0,10 2133,0 214,4 0,78 66169 38,7 1,6 133145
1952 0,10 2197,2 227,2 0,79 67407 38,5 1,7 135067
1953 0,11 2254,3 241,8 0,80 68471 38,3 1,8 136331
1954 0,11 2190,3 243,9 0,81 66843 37,8 1,9 131477
1955 0,11 2254,9 256,7 0,81 68367 37,8 1,9 134523
1956 0,12 2305,0 275,0 0,82 69968 37,5 2,0 136502
1957 0,13 2305,1 295,5 0,83 70262 37,0 2,2 135189
1958 0,14 2245,3 309,1 0,83 68578 36,7 2,4 130886
1959 0,14 2322,1 320,1 0,84 70149 36,8 2,4 134396
1960 0,15 2352,2 344,1 0,84 71128 36,5 2,5 135171
1961 0,15 2378,5 355,0 0,86 71183 36,3 2,6 134451
1962 0,15 2474,1 376,7 0,87 72673 36,4 2,7 137612
1963 0,15 2511,4 386,2 0,88 73413 36,4 2,8 139050
1964 0,16 2578,1 417,6 0,88 74990 36,3 3,0 141447
1965 0,17 2670,6 451,9 0,89 77239 36,3 3,1 145865
1966 0,18 2788,5 500,3 0,89 80802 36,0 3,3 151448
1967 0,19 2842,4 525,5 0,90 82645 35,7 3,4 153345
1968 0,20 2917,0 588,3 0,91 84733 35,5 3,8 156329
1969 0,22 2992,1 646,6 0,91 87071 35,4 4,0 160174
1970 0,23 2938,6 687,3 0,91 86867 34,9 4,4 157488
1971 0,26 2924,9 744,5 0,90 86715 34,8 4,7 156924
1972 0,27 3011,7 817,6 0,91 88838 34,8 5,1 160873
1973 0,29 3135,0 909,4 0,91 92542 34,8 5,4 167271
1974 0,31 3148,2 988,5 0,91 94121 34,2 5,9 167425
1975 0,35 3082,9 1063,9 0,92 92575 33,8 6,5 162879
1976 0,38 3174,4 1194,0 0,92 94922 33,9 7,1 167169
1977 0,41 3277,4 1334,5 0,92 98202 33,8 7,7 172780
1978 0,44 3430,3 1504,2 0,92 102931 33,8 8,3 180842
1979 0,47 3554,7 1673,2 0,92 106463 33,7 9,0 186791
1980 0,52 3535,7 1827,9 0,92 107061 33,3 9,9 185591
1981 0,55 3563,8 1968,8 0,93 108050 33,2 10,6 186257
1982 0,60 3519,7 2096,3 0,93 106749 32,9 11,5 182772
1983 0,63 3586,7 2269,8 0,94 107810 33,1 12,2 185457
1984 0,66 3786,7 2499,1 0,94 112604 33,2 12,9 194555
1985 0,69 3882,9 2679,0 0,95 115205 33,1 13,5 198445
1986 0,75 3926,3 2931,1 0,95 117171 32,9 14,6 200242
1987 0,74 4075,1 3019,7 0,96 120474 32,9 14,6 206312
1988 0,75 4207,7 3172,2 0,96 123927 32,9 15,0 211918
1989 0,80 4348,4 3457,8 0,97 126755 33,0 15,9 217651
1990 0,84 4381,5 3680,8 0,97 128341 32,9 16,8 219306
1991 0,88 4322,0 3800,2 0,98 127080 32,5 17,7 214994
1992 0,94 4353,9 4086,9 0,98 127238 32,6 19,0 215477
1993 0,96 4497,4 4297,7 0,99 129770 32,8 19,5 221003
1994 0,96 4628,3 4453,1 0,99 132799 32,9 19,6 226975
1995 0,98 4770,7 4660,5 1,00 135672 33,0 20,0 232545
1996 1,00 4861,7 4861,7 1,00 138018 32,8 20,6 235798
1997 1,03 4987,9 5122,0 1,00 141184 33,0 21,1 242160
1998 1,08 5108,8 5491,5 1,00 144305 33,0 22,2 247783
1999 1,12 5204,8 5823,4 1,00 147036 32,9 23,1 251683
Notes:  Value is in billions of current dollars. Quantity is in billions of 1996 dollars. Price and
quality are normalized to one in 1996. Employment is in thousands of workers. Weekly hours
is hours per worker, divided by 52. Hourly compensation is in current dollars. Hours worked
are in millions of hours.2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 33
Table 6: Sources of Gross Domestic Product Growth
1948–99 1948–73 1973–90 1990–95 1995–99
                                   Outputs
Gross Domestic Product 3,46 3,99 2,86 2,36 4,08
Contribution of Information Technology 0,40 0,20 0,46 0,57 1,18
Computers 0,12 0,04 0,16 0,18 0,36
Software 0,08 0,02 0,09 0,15 0,39
Communications Equipment 0,10 0,08 0,10 0,10 0,17
Information Technology Services 0,10 0,06 0,10 0,15 0,25
Contribution of Non-Information
Technology 3,06 3,79 2,40 1,79 2,91
Contribution of Non-Information
Technology Investment 0,72 1,06 0,34 0,23 0,83
Contribution of Non-Information
Technology Consumption 2,34 2,73 2,06 1,56 2,08
                                        Inputs
Gross Domestic Income 2,84 3,07 2,61 2,13 3,33
Contribution of Information Technology
Capital Services 0,34 0,16 0,40 0,48 0,99
Computers 0,15 0,04 0,20 0,22 0,55
Software 0,07 0,02 0,08 0,16 0,29
Communications Equipment 0,11 0,10 0,12 0,10 0,14
Contribution of Non-Information
Technology Capital Services 1,36 1,77 1,05 0,61 1,07
Contribution of Labor Services 1,14 1,13 1,16 1,03 1,27
Total Factor Productivity 0,61 0,92 0,25 0,24 0,75
Notes:  Average annual percentage rates of growth. The contribution of an output or input is
the rate of growth, multiplied by the value share.34 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
Table 7: Sources of Average Labor Productivity Growth
1948–99 1948–73 1973–90 1990–95 1995–99
Gross Domestic Product 3,46 3,99 2,86 2,36 4,08
Hours Worked 1,37 1,16 1,59 1,17 1,98
Average Labor Productivity 2,09 2,82 1,26 1,19 2,11
Contribution of Capital Deepening 1,13 1,45 0,79 0,64 1,24
Information Technology 0,30 0,15 0,35 0,43 0,89
Non-Information Technology 0,83 1,30 0,44 0,21 0,35
Contribution of Labor Quality 0,34 0,46 0,22 0,32 0,12
Total Factor Productivity 0,61 0,92 0,25 0,24 0,75
Information Technology 0,16 0,06 0,19 0,25 0,50
Non-Information Technology 0,45 0,86 0,06 -0,01 0,25
                                                        Addendum
Labor Input 1,95 1,95 1,97 1,70 2,18
Labor Quality 0,58 0,79 0,38 0,53 0,20
Capital Input 4,12 4,64 3,57 2,75 4,96
Capital Stock 3,37 4,21 2,74 1,82 2,73
Capital Quality 0,75 0,43 0,83 0,93 2,23
Notes: Average annual percentage rates of growth. Contributions are defined in Equation (3)
of the text.
Table 8: Sources of Total Factor Productivity Growth
1948–99 1948–73 1973–90 1990–95 1995–99
Total Factor Productivity Growth 0,61 0,92 0,25 0,24 0,75
                                               Contributions to TFP Growth:
Information Technology 0,16 0,06 0,19 0,25 0,50
Computers 0,09 0,02 0,12 0,15 0,32
Software 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,05 0,09
Communications Equipment 0,05 0,03 0,06 0,05 0,08
Non-Information Technology 0,45 0,86 0,06 -0,01 0,25
                                               Relative Price Changes:
Information Technology -6,16 -4,3 -7,4 -7,2 -11,5
Computers -23,01 -23,5 -21,1 -18,0 -34,5
Software -3,29 -3,0 -3,2 -3,9 -4,8
Communications Equipment -3,71 -3,1 -4,2 -4,0 -5,3
Non-Information Technology -0,41 -0,9 0,0 0,1 -0,1
                                                  Average Nominal Shares:
Information Technology 2,07 1,09 2,60 3,46 4,26
Computers 0,40 0,10 0,61 0,81 0,94
Software 0,51 0,08 0,60 1,30 1,84
Communications Equipment 1,16 0,91 1,39 1,34 1,48
Non-Information Technology 97,20 98,46 96,55 95,35 94,35
Notes:  Average annual rates of growth. Prices are relative to the price of gross domestic
income. Contributions are relative price changes, weighted by average nominal output shares.2001 ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ ÒÅÎÐÈÈ 35
Chart 1:  Relative Prices of Computers and Semiconductors, 1959-1999
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Note:  All price indexes are divided by the output price index.
Chart 2: Relative Prices of Computers, Communications, Software, and 
Services, 1948-99
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Note:  All price indexes are divided by the output price index.36 ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÉ ÆÓÐÍÀË ÂØÝ ¹ 1
Chart 3:  Relative Prices of Computers, Communications, and Software, 1959-1999
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Chart 4: Output Shares of Information Technology by Type, 1948-99
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Note: Share of current dollar gross domestic product.